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Abstract
Using store-level and aggregated Consumer Price Index data, we show that restau-
rant prices rise in response to minimum wage increases under several sources of identifying
variation. We introduce a general model of employment determination that implies min-
imum wage hikes cause prices to rise in competitive labor markets but potentially fall in
monopsonistic environments. Furthermore, the model implies employment and prices are
always negatively related. Therefore, our empirical results provide evidence against the
importance of monopsony power for understanding small observed employment responses
to minimum wage changes. Our estimated price responses challenge other explanations
of the small employment response too.
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11 Introduction
This paper utilizes unique data to test whether restaurant prices respond to minimum
wage changes. We ﬁnd that restaurant prices unambiguously rise after minimum wage in-
creases are enacted.1 Furthermore, these price increases are larger for establishments that are
more likely to pay the minimum wage. These results are derived from a panel of store-level
restaurant prices that are the basis for the food away from home component of the Consumer
Price Index (CPI) during a three-year period with two Federal minimum wage increases, and
are corroborated using a longer panel of city-level food away from home pricing from the
CPI.
Because of the breadth of our price data, we can take advantage of several sources of
variation. First, some states set their minimum wage above the Federal level. Second, we can
distinguish restaurants that tend to pay the minimum wage from those that do not. Third,
the fraction of workers paid at or near the minimum wage varies across geographic areas. All
three sources of variation indicate that most, if not all, of the higher labor costs faced by
employers are pushed onto customers in the form of higher prices.
As suggested by Brown (1999), the size and sign of these price responses can be used
to infer whether monopsony power is important for understanding the employment response
to minimum wage hikes. The minimum wage literature has become contentious since Card
and Krueger’s (e.g. 1995, 2000) research found that an increase in the minimum wage has
no, or even a small positive, eﬀect on employment. Therefore, their research contradicts
standard models of competitive labor markets, which, prior to their work, most researchers
suspected was relevant for industries which primarily employed minimum wage workers.2
1We are not the ﬁrst to estimate price pass-through in this context. See, e.g., Converse et al (1981),
Card and Krueger (1995), and Aaronson (2001). Card and Krueger use Consumer Price Indices for Food
Away from Home in 27 large metropolitan areas over a three year period, ﬁnding larger price increases in
those cities with higher proportions of low-wage workers. Although their estimates are consistent with full
pass-through, their standard errors are extremely large. They cannot reject zero price pass-through in many
of their speciﬁcations. Moreover, additional evidence from speciﬁc state increases in Texas and New Jersey
suggests close to no price response. As a result, they conclude that their estimates are “too imprecise to reach
a more conﬁdent assessment about the eﬀects of the minimum wage on restaurant prices.” The size of the
panel that we use in this study allows us to estimate price eﬀects much more precisely.
2See, for example, Brown et al (1982). The standard competitive model’s predictions are generally consis-
tent with recent views reported in a survey of leading labor economists (Fuchs, Krueger, and Poterba 1998)
as well. However, a full quarter of respondents believe there is no teenage disemployment eﬀect from a 10
percent increase in the minimum wage.
2However, their results are consistent with monopsony power in the labor market, as Stigler
(1946) discussed many years ago. The diverse ﬁndings reported in the ﬂurry of replies to
their work (e.g. Neumark and Wascher (1996, 2000), Deere et al. (1995), Kim and Taylor
(1995), Burkhauser et al. (2000), Dickens et al (1999)) led one observer to note that “[Card
and Krueger’s] lasting contribution may well be to show that we just don’t know how many
jobs would be lost if the minimum wage were increased...and that we are unlikely to ﬁnd
out by using more sophisticated methods of inference on the existing body of data. What is
needed is more sophisticated data” (Kennan 1995).
Restaurant prices complement the existing evidence on employment responses because,
as we show below, output prices and employment are unambiguously negatively related in re-
sponse to an exogenous change in wage rates. In order to show this relationship, we introduce
a general model of employment determination that allows for a range of output and input
market structures. Part of the reasoning behind the negative relationship between output
prices and employment is based on the negative relationship between prices and output. We
also add some weak assumptions to the model to show that output and labor input are posi-
tively related. Therefore, if the output price rises in response to a minimum wage hike, both
output and labor input have fallen. This will be the case if labor markets are competitive.
Conversely, if the output price falls in response to a minimum wage hike, total output and
labor input have increased. This will potentially be the case if ﬁrms have monopsony power
in the labor market.
Research on monopsony power has recently been revitalized by the empirical and theo-
retical work of Card and Krueger (1995), Burdett and Mortenson (1998), Bashkar and To
(1999), Ahn and Arcidiacono (2003), Flinn (2006), Manning (1995), and Rebitzer and Taylor
(1995).3 But our results suggest that competition is likely more relevant than monopsony.
Moreover, in Aaronson and French (2007), we show that a computational model of labor
demand with a competitive labor market structure predicts price responses that are compa-
rable to those found in this paper. The employment elasticities that are derived from that
3Although few believe that low wage labor markets are characterized by pure monopsony, as in Stigler
(1946), many models give rise to monopsony-like behavior that corroborate Card and Krueger’s ﬁndings of
small or even positive employment movements after a minimum wage increase. These include models where
transportation (Bashkar and To 1999) or employee search (Burdett and Mortenson 1998; Ahn and Arcidiacono
2003; Flinn 2006) is costly and employers are not able to discriminate high and low reservation wage workers.
Eﬃciency wage models such as Manning (1995) and Rebitzer and Taylor (1995) can also cause monopsony-like
employment eﬀects. See Boal and Ransom (1997) and Manning (2003) for broader reviews.
3calibrated model are within the bounds set by the empirical literature.
To be clear, as Boal and Ransom (1997), among others, point out, our results do not
necessarily prove labor markets are competitive. Although the results are clearly consistent
with this conclusion, if the minimum wage is set high enough, positive comovement between
the minimum wage and prices may be consistent with the monopsony model as well. We
discuss this point more formally below.
However, our results provide evidence against the hypothesis that monopsony power is
important for understanding the observed small employment responses found in some min-
imum wage studies. Indeed, our estimated price responses provide evidence against other
explanations of the small employment response as well, including the potential substitution
of nonwage for wage compensation and the importance of endogenous work eﬀort or eﬃciency
wages. They do, however, provide support for a model of ”hungry teenagers,” whereby higher
income resulting from a minimum wage increase causes low wage workers to buy more mini-
mum wage products, attenuating the disemployment eﬀect of the minimum wage. Although
our test answers a fairly narrow question, we believe that the answer to this question is of
broad interest. Given that the low observed employment responses to minimum wage changes
sparked particular interest in the importance of monopsony power in the labor market, our
results should temper this interest.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that our estimates are for the restaurant industry
only. This industry is a major employer of low-wage labor and therefore a particularly relevant
one to study.4 However, as a result of diﬀerent intensities of use of minimum wage labor,
substitution possibilities, market structure, or demand for their products, other industries
might face diﬀerent employment responses. See Aaronson and French (2007) for further
details.
4Eating and drinking places (SIC 641) is the largest employer of workers at or near the minimum, accounting
for roughly a ﬁfth of such employees in 1994 and 1995. The next largest employer, retail grocery stores, employs
less than 7 percent of minimum or near minimum wage workers. Moreover, the intensity of use of minimum
wage workers in the eating and drinking industry is amongst the highest of all sectors, with approximately 23
percent of all workers, encompassing 11 percent of the industry wage bill, within 10 percent of the minimum
wage. All calculations in this footnote are based on the Current Population Survey’s outgoing rotation groups.
Other prominent examples of studies that concentrate on the restaurant industry include Katz and Krueger
(1992), Card and Krueger (1995,2000) and Neumark and Wascher (2000).
42 Data
Under an agreement with the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), we were granted access
to the store-level data employed to construct the food away from home component of the
CPI during 1995 to 1997.5 While the time frame is short, this three-year period contains
an unusual amount of minimum wage activity. A bill signed on August 20, 1996 raised the
federal minimum from $4.25 to $5.15 per hour, with the increase phased in gradually. An
initial increase to $4.75 (11.8 percent) occurred on October 1, and the ﬁnal installment (8.4
percent) took eﬀect on September 1, 1997. Moreover, additional variation can be exploited
since price responses will vary geographically. This occurs for two reasons. First, market
wages may exceed minimum wages in some areas but not in others. Second, some states set
minimum wages above the federal level. We capture the latter source of heterogeneity by
allowing the eﬀective minimum wage to be the maximum of the state and federal level.6
The sample itself is based on nearly 7,500 food items at over 1,000 diﬀerent establishments
in 88 Primary Sampling Units (PSUs).7 Because restaurants in some geographic areas are
surveyed every other month, all numbers are reported as bimonthly (every other month)
price changes.8 Within an establishment, speciﬁc items, usually 7 or 8, are selected for
pricing with probability proportional to sales. During our time frame, an “item” usually was
a meal, as the BLS aimed to price complete meals as typically purchased (for example, a
meal item might consist of a hamburger, french fries, and a soft drink). Our dataset codes
items broadly, such as breakfast, lunch, dinner, or snacks. Unfortunately, because there are no
speciﬁc item descriptions, we cannot tie price changes to item-speciﬁc measures of input price
changes (such as ground beef or chicken price indexes). Nevertheless, the BLS strives to price
5Because the BLS introduced a complete outlet and item resampling in January 1998, we only use data
through December 1997. Data prior to 1995 are no longer available. Bils and Klenow (2004) use the same
1995 to 1997 period.
6This source of variation is especially useful in section 3.3, when we look at city level variation between
1979 and 1995. During 1995 to 1997, 10 states (not including Alaska which is always $0.50 above the federal
level) had minimum wages above the federal level for some part of the period. Six states (HI, MA, NJ, OR,
VT, and WA) were at or above the federal minimum of $4.75 prior to October of 1996. Three states (HI, MA,
and OR) were at or above the federal minimum prior to September 1997. Further variation is available from
states (CA, CT, NJ, WA) that were between the old $4.75 minimum wage but below the new $5.15 minimum
wage.
7The 88 PSUs cover 76 metropolitan statistical areas and 12 other areas representing the urban non-metro
U.S.
8PSUs were assigned to one of three reporting cycles: outlets in the ﬁve largest were surveyed each month,
while others were surveyed in two bimonthly cycles of odd and even numbered months. For sample size and
consistency, we randomly assigned outlets in the ﬁve largest PSUs to odd or even two month cycles.
5identical items over time, and codes in our database describe temporal item substitutions due
to discontinuance and alteration. Our analysis focuses on price changes for identical items,
and we do not compare prices where the BLS has made an item substitution.9
A particular advantage of this data is its depiction of the type of business. Limited service
(LS) outlets, which account for roughly 30 percent of the sample, are those stores where meals
are served for on- or oﬀ-premises consumption and patrons typically place orders and pay at
the counter before they eat. Roughly half the sample is comprised of full service (FS) outlets,
establishments that provide wait-service, sell food primarily for on-premises consumption,
take orders while patrons are seated at a table, booth or counter, and typically ask for
payment from patrons after they eat.10 The minimum wage is likely to increase wages at
LS restaurants more than at FS restaurants, for two reasons. First, wages for cashiers and
crew members are higher, perhaps by 60%, at FS restaurants than LS restaurants.11 Thus,
a higher fraction of workers are paid the minimum wage at LS restaurants. Second, many
FS employees are paid through tips and the federal tipped minimum wage remained $2.13
throughout our sample period. Thus, minimum wage changes have smaller eﬀects on wages
9Firms could respond to a minimum wage increase by reducing quality, instead of raising price. While we
do not have direct measures of quality, the dataset notes whether an item is the same as the item priced in
the previous month. There is no evidence of any increased incidence of item changes or substitutions following
minimum wage increases, suggesting that quality changes or item substitution are not a standard means of
dealing with a cost shock. There also might be concern that a minimum wage increase changes the composition
of items sampled. If revenues are negatively correlated with prices and sampling probability is a function of
sales, a change in the minimum wage could result in a shift in the distribution of sampled products towards
high priced items (or stores with fewer minimum wage workers). To minimize this concern, we ran everything
with sampling weights and found identical results.
10The BLS replaced an old ordering with these types of business codes in July 1996, and began to report
price indexes for type of business groupings after our data period in January 1998. Businesses surveyed
early in our sample period were retroactively assigned the new codes. The remaining ﬁfth of non-LS and
non-FS outlets, which we usually exclude from this analysis, include meals consumed at department stores,
supermarkets, convenience stores, gas stations, vending machines, and many other outlets.
11Assuming that LS wage rates are identical to U.S. McDonald’s wage rates collected by McKinsey Global
Institute and reported in Ashenfelter and Jurajda (2001), then wage rates among cashier and crew members
in FS establishments in the outgoing rotation ﬁles of the CPS are about 60 percent higher than wage rates in
LS establishments. Ashenfelter and Jurajda report the average U.S. McDonald’s wage for crew and cashier
workers was $6.00 and $6.50 in December 1998 and August 2000, respectively. We compared these ﬁgures
to the average wage of $7.81 and $8.52 for CPS workers that report their industry as eating and drinking
places and their occupation as food preparation and service occupation, janitors and cleaners, or sales counter
clerks during the fourth quarter of 1998 or the third quarter of 2000. Assuming all LS establishments pay the
same wage as McDonalds and noting that the 1997 Economic Census of Accommodations and Food Services
reports that 48 percent of all employees in FS and LS establishments are employed in the LS sector, we can
back out that FS establishments pay roughly 60 percent higher hourly wages than LS establishments within
these occupation codes. The Economic Census also reports average weekly wages that are approximately 20
percent higher in FS establishments. But this calculation does not correct for diﬀerences in hours worked per
week and cannot reﬁne the sample by occupational class.
6in FS outlets than LS outlets because tip earnings usually exceed eﬀective minimum wages.12
3 Estimates of Price Pass-Through
One problem with price (as well as employment) data is that they are potentially measured
with error.13 In other words, pijkt = p∗
ijkt + ǫijkt, where pijkt is the measured price of item
k at outlet j in state i during month t, p∗
ijkt is the model predicted value, where the model
is described in section 4, and ǫijkt is measurement or model misspeciﬁcation error.14 We
approach the data in three ways.
3.1 Store-level Descriptions of Price Increases and Decreases
Our ﬁrst approach ignores errors in the price data and simply tabulates price increases and
decreases after a minimum wage change. In the model described in section 4, we formally show
that price data can be used to infer labor market structure. In particular, price cuts tend to
be an outcome unique to monopsonistic labor markets. In the absence of measurement error,
observed price cuts allow us to identify individual ﬁrms that potentially have monopsony
power. On the other hand, if variability in ǫijkt is signiﬁcant, measurement or misspeciﬁcation
error may cause us to erroneously infer monopsony power when in fact none exists.
12Federal law sets a separate cash minimum for tipped employees (which is $2.13 throughout our sample
period), but requires that tips plus cash wages must at least equal the nontipped employee minimum. For
example, in September 1996, $2.62 ($4.75-2.13) in tips are allowed to be applied to a tipped employee’s wage
to reach the minimum wage. In 1996, only Rhode Island and Vermont changed their state-speciﬁc tipped
minimum. In 1997, Maryland, Michigan, North Dakota, and Vermont did as well. Of these states, only
Maryland and Michigan are included in our CPI sample.
13Measurement error is unlikely to be important in this data (Bils and Klenow 2004). The BLS has proce-
dures in place to ﬂag and investigate unusual observations. Nevertheless, some measurement error may exist
for the following three reasons. First, the price on the menu may diﬀer from the price paid because of dis-
counts and coupons distributed outside of outlets. Prices are collected net of sales and promotions but some,
particularly those not run by the outlet itself may be missed. Second, high frequency but short-term price
changes may not be captured by our monthly data (Chevalier et al 2003). Third, surveyors may falsely report
last month’s price instead of going to the restaurant to record the price, a practice known as “curbstoning”.
There is no reason to think that any of these sources of error are correlated with the presence of a minimum
wage change.
14There are other interpretations for ǫijkt, such as menu costs of switching prices. Moreover, many ﬁrms in
our sample oﬀer short term sales for reasons that are unrelated to changes in input prices.
7Outlet type Limited Service Limited Service Full Service Full Service
Two month period with minimum wage change No Yes No Yes
A. Share of price changes, observation is an item
Percent increases 11.5 22.6** 10.7 12.0**
Percent decreases 2.9 2.5 1.8 1.6
Item Observations 25,815 3,853 44,632 7,045
B. Share of price changes, observation is the average of all items at a store
Percent increases 24.1 38.3** 19.5 22.4
Percent decreases 8.0 6.7 5.1 4.8
Store Observations 3,799 551 6,809 1,036
C. Size of price changes (in percent)
Mean item price change—increase 5.3 4.8** 4.8 4.9
Mean item price change—decrease 8.4 8.2 7.5 9.3*
* (**) = Statistically diﬀerent from months without a minimum wage increase at the 5(1) percent level.
Table 1: The Frequency and Magnitude of Store-Level Price Changes
8Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on the frequency and size of price changes for Limited
Service (column 2) and Full Service (column 4) outlets in the two months immediately after a
minimum wage change. For comparison, all other two month periods are reported in columns
1 and 3. In panel A, the observational unit is a food item. Because multiple items are surveyed
for each store, individual stores are in these computations up to 8 times each period. Panel
B computes price changes by store. That is, an average price is calculated from each store’s
sampled items and consequently a store is included, at most, once every two months.
There are several notable features of the data. First and foremost, prices increase in re-
sponse to a minimum wage change. During the two months after a minimum wage increase,
22.6 percent of LS items increased in price. This is almost double the 11.5 percent share of
LS price quotes that are increased in months without a minimum wage increase.15 Moreover,
as expected, the minimum wage eﬀect is substantially smaller, although still statistically sig-
niﬁcant, for full service outlets. In such stores, the share of quotes that are higher than the
previous two months is 12 percent, exceeding months that do not follow a minimum wage
increase by 1.3 percentage points. Excluding small price changes (say, those less than 2 per-
cent) that might be driven by measurement error reinforces these diﬀerences. Price increases
over 2 percent are more than twice as likely in minimum wage months in LS establishments
(17.6 versus 8.6 percent) and 22 percent more likely in FS establishments (8.9 versus 7.2
percent).
Conversely, there is little evidence that minimum wage increases cause price declines.
The share of prices that decline is stable throughout the three years regardless of whether the
minimum wage has been altered. The results are identical when small changes are excluded.
Therefore, based on incidence alone, the data suggest that many ﬁrms raise their price, but
few reduce it, in response to a change in the minimum wage.
These results are robust to looking at price movements at the store-level, as reported in
panel B. Here, prices are computed by averaging the price of all items in a store. Again, there
is a notable acceleration of LS outlet price increases following a minimum wage increase (38.3
percent versus 24.1 percent) but no unusual increase in price declines during these periods.16
15The unconditional probability of a price change matches Bils and Klenow (2004), who also use CPI
microdata.
16We have explored looking at longer intervals but are quite limited by our data. The September 1997
increase is only 4 months before the end of our sample, so we are forced to rely on a single comparison: pre-
and post- the 1996 increase. The results are a bit more muted but similar inferences can be drawn. LS price
9Finally, increasing the frequency of price changes is not the only avenue for ﬁrms to raise
or lower prices. The size of price changes could be altered as well.17 However, panel C shows
that, if anything, price increases tend to be slightly smaller in size after minimum wage
increases. The size of LS price cuts are unaﬀected by minimum wage changes. There is some
evidence of larger price cuts in FS establishments after minimum wage hikes, but this is a
rare event (only 1.6 percent of all FS item observations). It is worth noting that, while price
cuts (in FS and LS stores) are rare, they can be large. Over a quarter of all food away from
home price cuts exceed 10 percent, and over a tenth exceed 20 percent. By comparison, price
increases are more tightly concentrated, with about half under 4 percent and less than a tenth
above 10 percent.18 However, there is little evidence that the size of price cuts change in any
meaningful way after a minimum wage increase. Kolmogorov-Smirnov D-tests for diﬀerences
in price distributions ﬁnds no signiﬁcant shift in the size of price cuts following minimum
wage increases.19 The fact that these large declines exist in roughly the same fashion in non-
minimum wage change periods suggests to us that the largest cuts typically reﬂect temporary
sales.
Assuming that all markets are competitive (or, as we point out in Section 4.3, factor
markets are competitive and product markets are monopolistically competitive) and ﬁrms
have a constant returns to scale production function, it is straightforward to show that all
cost increases will be passed onto consumers in the form of higher prices. If minimum wage
labor’s share of total ﬁrm costs is smin, then a 10% increase in the minimum wage should
increase the product price smin × 10%.
To get a sense of whether the observed price responses are consistent with competition,
we note that minimum wage labor’s share of total costs is equal to labor’s share of total
hikes in the 10 months after October 1996 are 6 percentage points (53 vs. 47 percent) more common than in
the average 10 month period in the year and a half prior to October 1996. Price declines occur slightly more
frequently (but not statistically so) in the 10 months after the increase: 6 percent versus 5 percent.
17See MacDonald and Aaronson (2006) for a more extensive discussion of the various ways restaurants
construct price changes. The price change distributions are available upon request from the authors.
18Price changes cluster near the mean, with excess kurtosis of 62.0 and 80.8 for price changes among LS and
FS outlets, respectively. Distributions of increases and decreases are also quite peaked compared to normal
distributions, with excess kurtosis of 14.2 (LS) and 8.6 (FS) for increases, and 1.6 (LS) and 6.8 (FS) for
decreases. Kashyap (1995) also reports positive excess kurtosis in his sample of catalog prices.
19In particular, the K-S D-test suggests no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the distribution of increases among LS
outlets. Small changes (less than 2 percent) occur among 22 percent of LS price changes in minimum wage
bimonths, compared to 25 percent in all other bimonths. Large changes (greater than 10 percent) occur
among 12 percent of LS price changes observed in minimum wage bimonths, compared to 13 percent in all
other bimonths. There is a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence, driven by the higher incidence of very small
increases, among FS outlets.
10costs multiplied by minimum wage labor’s share of labor costs. 10-K company reports, the
Economic Census for Accommodations and Foodservices, and the IRS’ Statistics on Income
Bulletin all provide an estimate of labor’s share of total costs, and in each, the sample median
and mean are around 30 to 35 percent.20 Unfortunately, we are less certain of minimum wage
labor’s share of total labor costs for the average ﬁrm. Using household level data, we know
that about a third of all restaurant workers are paid near the minimum wage over this
time period, constituting 17% of all payments to labor.21 Using these values, we make two
calculations that bound the competitive response. If there is only one type of labor, all ﬁrms
have the same employment level, and all ﬁrms either pay 0% of their workers or 100% of
their workers the minimum wage, depending on the labor market, then 33% of all ﬁrms pay
the minimum wage. Given this, and the fact that about 33% of total costs are in the form of
labor costs, then a 10% increase in the minimum wage raises prices by 10% × 33% × 33% =
1.09%. Alternatively, if all ﬁrms hire above minimum wage labor in equal proportions, then
each restaurant must have 17% of its labor costs going to minimum wage labor. Thus, a 10%
increase in the minimum wage should raise prices by 10% × 33% × 17% = 0.56%.
Aaronson and French (2007) use a calibrated model of labor demand that accounts for
both ﬁrm and worker heterogeneity to show that when these factors are explicitly accounted
for, the competitive model predicts prices will increase by roughly 0.7%. Moreover, because
20Of the 17 restaurant companies that appear in a search of 1995 reports using the U.S. Security and
Exchange Commissions (SEC) Edgar database, the unconditional mean and median of the payroll to total
expense ratio from 10-K reports is 30 percent. This search uses ﬁve keywords: restaurant, steak, seafood,
hamburger, and chicken. Limited service establishments, like McDonalds and Burger King, are at or below
the mean. Full service restaurant companies, like Bob Evans and California Pizza Kitchen, lie above. Similarly,
the 1997 Economic Census for Accommodations and Foodservices reports payroll as 31 and 25 percent of sales
at full and limited service restaurants, respectively. Since 10-Ks from food away from home companies generally
show that wages account for 85 percent of compensation, the Economic Census’ estimate of labor share based
on compensation is roughly 36 and 29 percent at full and limited service restaurants. Another method of
calculating lfabor’s share is through a sampling of 1995 corporate income tax forms from the Internal Revenue
Service’s Statistics on Income Bulletin. Because operating costs are broken down by category, it is possible
to estimate labor’s share. We restrict the sample to partnerships because of IRS concern that labor costs
are notoriously diﬃcult to decompose for corporations. Despite the quite diﬀerent sampling of ﬁrms relative
to the Edgar Database, labor cost as a share of operating costs for eating place partnerships is of a similar
magnitude to the other estimates, roughly 33 percent. Finally, these ﬁgures correspond well to a 2002 survey
of restaurants by Deloitte and Touche (2003). Among limited service establishments, Deloitte and Touche ﬁnd
that wages and salaries make up 31 percent of total expenses. Beneﬁts add another 2 percent. The payroll to
expense ratio is roughly 2 percent higher for full service establishments.
21See Aaronson and French (2007) for a description of this calculation. Because wage distributions are not
available in company reports, we estimate the share of employees that are paid at or near the minimum wage
from the outgoing rotation ﬁles of the CPS for the two years prior to the 1996 legislation. We use a survey in
Card and Krueger (1995, p. 162) to account for the share of workers paid slightly above the minimum wage
that are impacted by new legislation.
11limited service restaurants are more likely to pay the minimum wage than full service restau-
rants, competition would imply larger price increases at limited service restaurants. Given
that some restaurants do not increase prices after minimum wage hikes, but restaurants that
do raise their prices usually do so by more than 0.7%, it is diﬃcult to compare the observed
price response to the competitive prediction. Section 3.2 presents a statistical model to better
make this comparison.
3.2 Estimates of Price Pass-Through
The next approach provides a more complete statistical model of the price response to
a minimum wage change. In our basic model we regress the log change in prices for item k
at outlet j in period t on the percentage change in the minimum wage in state i over the










ωh∆lnwmin,it−h + uijkt (1)
We include wmin,it−1 and wmin,it+1 to allow a more ﬂexible response to the legislation, as
price responses can play out over time. Consider the timing of the 1996-97 federal increase.
When the law was passed, ﬁrms knew that minimum wages would be increased on October
1, 1996, and again on September 1, 1997. It is conceivable that ﬁrms could react to the
expectation of an increase (i.e. at the bill discussion or passage), rather than the enactment
dates. However, empirically, we found no evidence of longer leads or lags.22
The vector of controls include contemporaneous and lags of changes in the producer price
index for processed foods to account for material input price shocks faced by sample outlets
(lnPPIt).23 To allow for mean-reverting price movements that typically occur after sales or
22Businesses knew of the 1996 increase just 2 to 4 months prior to implementation. They knew of the 1997
increase, speciﬁed in the 1996 bill, 13 to 15 months before implementation. The 1996 increase could not have
been predicted until shortly before the House of Representatives vote on May 23, after a week of legislative
maneuvering that almost consigned the bill to defeat (Weisman 1996 and Rubin 1996). Even then, the ﬁnal
timing of the minimum wage increase did not become clear until adoption of the conference report on August
2. Aaronson (2001) shows that longer-run price pass-through estimates are roughly the same size as short-run
estimates using aggregated U.S. and Canadian price data.
23Aaronson (2001) accounts for the costs of particular food items, such as chicken, beef, bread, cheese,
lettuce, tomatoes, and potatoes, and ﬁnds similar aggregated results to those reported here. We also controlled
for broader labor market pressures using changes in CPS median wages and ﬁxed chain and PSU (i.e. city)
eﬀects (not shown). Minimum wage point estimates and standard errors are quite robust to the inclusion of
these variables. Furthermore, the ﬁxed eﬀects themselves added almost nothing to the model’s ﬁt. Controls
for mealtype (breakfast, lunch, or dinner) are also included but have no impact on the results.
12price hikes, we also experimented with controls for lags in lnpijkt. However, the minimum
wage estimates barely change whether lagged dependent variables are accounted for or not
(the version reported in table 2 includes them).24
Table 2 presents the basic results. Since quotes from the same outlet are unlikely to be
statistically independent, all standard errors account for quote (i.e. menu items within an
establishment) clustering, using Huber-White robust estimation techniques. We also checked
for error clustering by city, chain, and outlet. While within-outlet eﬀects were important,
within-city and within-chain eﬀects were not. All results are reported as elasticities and
multiplied by 10 to gauge the impact of a 10 percent minimum wage increase.
24To be clear, the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable potentially leads to inconsistent parameter
estimates. In practice, this bias appears to be negligible. But for completeness, we also ran a speciﬁcation that
included one lag in lnpijkt that is instrumented by thrice lagged prices and found statistically indistinguishable
results. Moreover, to capture any asymmetry in the mean-reverting process, we separately measure percentage
increases and decreases in an item’s price in the previous periods. Parameter estimates are of the expected
sign: past price cuts lead to current period price increases, and past price increases lead to current price cuts,
presumably because the original increase reﬂected temporary cost increases or because rivals didn’t match the
price increase. However, these responses are dampened substantially. Full reversion to prior prices implies
absolute coeﬃcient values of 1, while the estimated eﬀects fall well below 1 and usually below 0.1.
13Variable All Limited service Full service All Limited service Limited service Full service Full service
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
∆ lnwmin,it−1 0.229 0.334 0.234 0.225 0.295 0.202 0.249 0.246
(0.064) (0.117) (0.082) (0.067) (0.120) (0.326) (0.087) (0.157)
∆ lnwmin,it 0.407 0.940 0.190 1.444 2.695 2.392 1.039 1.245
(0.070) (0.135) (0.086) (0.531) (0.883) (1.005) (0.692) (0.706)
∆ lnwmin,it+1 0.077 0.275 -0.102 0.078 0.243 0.451 -0.082 -0.228
(0.063) (0.136) (0.073) (0.067) (0.149) (0.431) (0.079) (0.164)
∆ lnwmin,it*wage20 -0.161 -0.278 -0.242 -0.128 -0.133
(0.078) (0.133) (0.134) (0.100) (0.100)
Total eﬀect 0.713 1.549 0.322
(0.140) (0.275) (0.168)
At wage20= $5.00 0.94 1.84 1.84 0.56 0.60
At wage20= $7.00 0.62 1.29 1.35 0.31 0.33
At wage20= $9.00 0.30 0.73 0.87 0.05 0.07
month dummies? no no no no no yes no yes
include PPI? yes yes yes yes yes no yes no
R2 0.070 0.167 0.017 0.070 0.171 0.175 0.019 0.021
N 71,077 21,883 36,928 63,630 18,691 18,691 33,875 33,875
See text for detail. Controls not shown in table include three lags in lnpijkt and mealtype (breakfast, lunch, or dinner).
Huber-White standard errors corrected for clustering at the item and establishment level are in parentheses.
Sample sizes in columns 2 and 3 do not add up to column 1 because some establishments are not categorized
as full or limited service restaurants.
Wage20 is the 20th percentile of the MSA’s hourly wage distribution, calculated from the 1996 CPS.
Table 2: The Price Response to a 10 Percent Minimum Wage Increase
1
4Column (1) reports the minimum wage eﬀect for the full sample of food away from home
establishments. We ﬁnd that a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage increases prices by
roughly 0.7 percent (with a standard error of 0.14), of which over half the response occurs
within the ﬁrst two months after the minimum wage change. However, because this result
combines outlets where the minimum wage is binding with those where it might be less
important, two particular sources of variation can be used to identify the price response to a
minimum wage increase.
First, as in table 1, we can take advantage of variation in the intensity of minimum wage
worker use between limited (column 2) and full (column 3) service restaurants. The price
increase generated by a 10 percent minimum wage hike is roughly 1.55 percent (standard error
of 0.28 percent) for limited service outlets but a ﬁfth that size for full service enterprises.25
Second, market wages vary across local labor markets. Where prevailing low-skill wages
far exceed minimum wages, minimum wage increases will have little impact on market wages
and consequently costs. Where the minimum binds for low-skill workers, changes in the
minimum wage will have strong eﬀects on wages.26 Therefore, we test whether the price
response varies with respect to the pay of low-skilled workers. We are able to perform this
test because our data include precise outlet locations (addresses and telephone numbers) that
we link to MSA hourly wage distributions estimated from the 1996 Current Population Survey
(CPS). Columns (4), (5), and (7) interact one version of these measures, the 20th percentile
from the MSA’s hourly wage (wage20) distribution, with the contemporaneous minimum
wage change using the full sample and subsample of limited and full service outlets.27 We
ﬁnd that minimum wage increases have larger eﬀects on prices in low wage areas, among both
limited and full service outlets. An MSA where the 20th percentile of the 1996 hourly wage is
$5 leads to a 0.56 percent price increase among full service outlets and a 1.84 percent increase
25Aaronson (2001) ﬁnds an elasticity of around 1.5 for fast food restaurants in the American Chamber of
Commerce price survey, consistent with the ﬁndings on limited service establishments.
26We can look at this directly using the outgoing rotation ﬁles of the CPS. Using a state panel developed
from the 1979-2002 ﬁles, we regressed log hourly earnings in the restaurant industry on the prevailing minimum
wage and state and year ﬁxed eﬀects. The data were too noisy and replete with missing observations at the
monthly level. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd that wages rise by 4.4 percent in the restaurant industry following a 10
percent increase in the minimum wage. Although we cannot distinguish full and limited service establishments,
we note that wages rise by 10.7 percent among teens and 7.1 percent among high school dropouts. The results
are similar when we restrict the sample to the CPI cities.
27The results are also comparable when changing the year used to calculate wage20, interacting wage20
with the lag and lead minimum wage change. Wage data for the 12 non-metro PSU’s are drawn from the
non-metro parts of the outlet’s state. CPS codes are unavailable for 9 MSAs, so sample sizes decline when
area wage data are included in the analysis.
15among limited service outlets. At a wage of $7 ($9), this eﬀect drops to 0.31 (0.05) and 1.29
(0.73) percent for full and limited service ﬁrms. We have also used the share of minimum
wage workers, prob(wit = wmin,it), as a measure of variation in minimum wage bindiness
across local labor market. The LS results are similar to those reported here, although less
precisely estimated.28 The coeﬃcient on ∆lnwit × prob(wit = wmin,it) is 0.49 (0.39) for
LS establishments and 0.17 (0.30) for FS establishments. At the mean value of the share of
workers paid at or near the minimum wage (6 percent), a 10 percent increase in the minimum
wage increases LS prices by 1.15 percent and FS prices by 0.38 percent, very similar to columns
(5) and (7) in table 2.
As a robustness check, columns (6) and (8) report results of a regression with the wage20
interaction that also includes a full set of month dummies.29 The month dummies eliminate
the possibility that the minimum wage changes are confounding other contemporaneous na-
tional inﬂation or economic trends or seasonal factors (since the two federal changes occur
in September and October). But as can be seen, this does not appear to be an economi-
cally or statistically important concern, either for LS or FS establishments. This is also true
when we use the share of minimum wage workers rather than the 20th percentile of the wage
distribution.
As a ﬁnal alternative, we estimated logit models that explore the relationship between
minimum wage changes and the probability of a price increase or decrease by outlet type.
These regressions use a very similar speciﬁcation to equation (1), but substitute ∆lnpijkt
with an indicator of whether there is a price increase (pijkt > 0) in one speciﬁcation and a
price decrease (pijkt < 0) in another.30 The ﬁrst four columns of table 3 report a speciﬁcation
that includes the lag, contemporaneous, and lead minimum wage change measure, along with
the controls described in the table. We ﬁnd that the likelihood of a price increase in LS outlets
jumps from 12 to 28 percent if a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage is introduced in a
28There is some debate on the extent to which minimum wage increases impact workers paid above the
minimum. See Card and Krueger (1995), Abowd et al (2000), and Lee (1999). We have experimented with
using those at or below the new minimum wage, as well as allowing for spillovers up to 20 percent above the
new minimum. This has little impact on the results.
29For identiﬁcation, we must drop the PPI controls in this speciﬁcation.
30The main deviation from equation (1) is that we include a dummy for prices ending in 99 cents, to account
for the extra stickiness apparent at such price points. See MacDonald and Aaronson (2006) or Kashyap (1995)
for further discussion. In the version reported here, we also include three lags in changes in item prices, an
indicator of whether any sampled price was changed by the outlet in the previous period, and indicators for
meal type. Inferences are not contigent on the inclusion of these additional covariates.
16period with otherwise stable prices. The probability of a price increase in FS establishments
increases from 10 to 13 percent following a similar sized minimum wage change. However,
a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage has no statistically signiﬁcant impact on the
probability of a price decline in either type of establishment. The ﬁnal two columns show
that MSAs with a lower 20th percentile wage are much more likely to see price increases
in both LS and FS establishments after a minimum wage increase. There is no such eﬀect
among price declines (not shown).
17Establishment type Limited service Full service Limited service Full service Limited Service Full Service
Price change Increase Increase Decrease Decrease Increase Increase
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6
∆ lnwmin,it−1 0.010 0.019 -0.007 0.004
(0.014) (0.011) (0.022) (0.018)
∆ lnwmin,it 0.104 0.027 -0.020 0.008 0.253 0.233
(0.012) (0.011) (0.021) (0.022) (0.095) (0.092)
∆ lnwmin,it+1 0.017 0.010 -0.029 0.014
(0.015) (0.012) (0.029) (0.021)
wage20 ∗ ∆ lnwmin,it -0.024 -0.032
(0.015) (0.014)
Constant -1.974 -2.150 -3.732 -4.403 -1.842 -2.485
(0.074) (0.063) (0.137) (0.136) (0.444) (0.381)
Base Probability of price change 0.122 0.104 0.023 0.012 0.137 0.077
After 10% minimum wage increase 0.282 0.132 0.019 0.013
at wage20=$5 0.349 0.189
at wage20=$7 0.241 0.121
at wage20=$9 0.158 0.076
Coeﬃcients and standard errors are derived from a logit model.
See text for detail. Controls not shown in table include whether the price ended in 99 cents,
three lags in lnpijkt, an indicator for whether any sampled price item was changed in the previous period,
and mealtype (breakfast, lunch, or dinner).
Table 3: The Probability of a Price Increase or Decrease in Response to a 10 Percent Minimum Wage Increase
1
83.3 City-level Price Responses
The micro data suggest that prices move higher in response to minimum wage changes
that occurred between 1995 and 1997. In this section, we show that the results are robust to
looking at a longer earlier period. Here, we use the publicly available city-level price indices
of the CPI between 1979 and 1995 to test whether cities with higher fractions of restaurant
workers impacted by the minimum wage laws are more likely to change their food prices.
Hence, identiﬁcation is based on the intensity of minimum wage worker usage. Our results
are based on a slightly modiﬁed form of equation (1):
∆lnpit
∆lnwmin,it
= γprob(wit = wmin,it) + β′xit + uit (2)
where i denotes city and the coeﬃcient γ = E[
∆lnpit
∆lnwmin,it|wit = wmin,it,xit] is the price
response to increases in the minimum wage. If producers have a constant returns to scale
production function, competitive theory implies that 100 percent of the higher labor costs
are passed on to the consumer in the form of higher prices. As we pointed out earlier, 100%
pass through implies that the percent increase in product price equals the percent increase
in the minimum wage multiplied by labor’s share. Therefore, γ should equal labor’s share
under perfect competition.
Figure 1 maps each city’s price response to a minimum wage hike against the share of
minimum wage workers in the city. Each observation, of which there are 82, represents a
city around the time of a minimum wage change. The data cover 4 federal minimum wage
hikes - in 1980, 1981, 1990, and 1991 – and a small number of state increases between 1979
and 1995.31 The horizontal axis plots prob(wit = wmin,it), the share of workers in a city’s
restaurant industry that are paid the minimum wage. This is computed from the outgoing
rotation ﬁles of the Current Population Survey (CPS). Because employees paid just above
the minimum wage are also aﬀected by the law, we include anyone paid within 120 percent of
31The federal minimum wage increased from $2.90 to $3.10 per hour in January 1980, to $3.35 in January
1981, to $3.80 in April 1990, and to $4.25 in April 1991. State increases tend not to occur in states represented
by CPI survey cities. The 27 CPI cities are New York City, Philadelphia, Boston, Pittsburgh, Buﬀalo,
Chicago, Detroit, St Louis, Cleveland, Minneapolis-St. Paul, Milwaukee, Cincinnati, Kansas City, DC, Dallas,
Baltimore, Houston, Atlanta, Miami, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle, San Diego, Portland, Honolulu,
Anchorage, and Denver. After 1986, prices for 12 of these cities – Buﬀalo, Minneapolis-St. Paul, Milwaukee,
Cincinnati, Kansas City, Atlanta, San Diego, and Seattle, Portland, Honolulu, Anchorage, and Denver – are
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Figure 1: City level price increases
20the old minimum wage during the nine months prior to the minimum wage enactment date.
However, the results are not sensitive to picking reasonable thresholds other than 120 percent
or time frames other than nine months. The vertical axis displays
∆lnpit
∆lnwmin,it, the ratio of
the log change in city food away from home prices to the log change in the city’s minimum
wage. The price data is the CPI for food away from home. The price changes are measured
from two months before to two months after the minimum wage is enacted.
∆lnpit
∆lnwmin,it is
adjusted for year ﬁxed eﬀects to account for inﬂation and other secular changes in national
labor market conditions.
The most noteworthy aspect of ﬁgure 1 is the positive correlation between the two series.
The regression coeﬃcient γ is 0.36 with a robust, city clustered-corrected standard error of
0.24.32 Not only is the sign of this coeﬃcient consistent with competition but the magnitude
is as well. Assuming perfect competition in the labor market, the regression coeﬃcient should
equal labor’s share. Recall from section 3, labor’s share is approximately 30 to 35 percent.
Note also the abundance of observations on
∆lnpit
∆lnwmin,it that are positive. Of the 82 city-
year observations, 19 are negative, including only 2 of the largest 30 price responses, deﬁned
as when |
∆lnpit
∆lnwmin,it| > 0.20. These two are interesting in that they come from the same city,
Denver, over consecutive years, 1980 and 1981. Unfortunately, we have little information as
to what was happening in Denver during this time but we can highlight it for being the main
example where city-level prices fall quickly in response to a minimum wage change.33
The most plausible alternative explanation for these price responses is that they are driven
by shocks to demand that happen to be correlated with changes to the minimum wage. We
tried two ways to test this possibility. First, we estimated equation 2 without year ﬁxed eﬀects
but included changes in the city CPI in the xit vector. The intercept from this speciﬁcation
is not statistically diﬀerent from zero, suggesting that prices do not rise after minimum wage
hikes in areas where the minimum wage does not bind. This ﬁnding is consistent with the
32Using the share of minimum wage workers within 110 percent of the old minimum, rather than 120 percent,
the point estimate (and adjusted standard error) is 0.42 (0.24). A Huber biweight regression procedure implies
a point estimate of 0.28 (0.16) and 0.42 (0.15) using the 110 and 120 percent minimum wage share thresholds.
Finally, out of concern that inﬂation, even over this short period, are driving our results, we tried two things.
First, when we include city price deﬂators as controls on the right hand side, the point estimates are roughly
0.50 with t-statistics of roughly 2 to 2.5. Alternatively, we look at price changes only over the two months after
the minimum wage change. In this case, the point estimate is between 0.20 and 0.30, again with t-statistics
of roughly 2 to 2.5.
33Since Denver is one of the 12 cities surveyed semiannually starting in 1986, we do not include the 1990
and 1991 Denver data points in the ﬁgure. However, they are both positive, albeit small: 0.19 for 1990 and
0.09 for 1991.
21view that demand shocks are not confounding our estimates because if they were, we would
expect that prices would rise in areas where the minimum wage does not bind.
As a second check, we searched for alternative measures of pit that vary by local demand
conditions, are available for our city panel, and, most importantly, are relatively unaﬀected
by low wage labor costs. By far, the two best candidates are housing and medical care.
Therefore, we reran the regression described above, but substituted food away from home
prices with these two indices. As expected, we ﬁnd no evidence that minimum wage hikes
are associated with price hikes for housing and medical care.34
Finally, we can compare the estimates in table 2 to predicted pass-through under com-
petition and constant returns to scale technology using metro variation in restaurant wage
distributions from the outgoing rotation ﬁles of the CPS. Under competition, the relation-
ship between these predicted price responses and the share of restaurant workers impacted
by minimum wage laws should correspond to labor share.
To conduct this test, we deﬁne two groups of cities. High wage cities are those with an
average hourly wage among the top ﬁfth of all metropolitan areas in 1997-98. Low wage cities
are those with average wages among the bottom ﬁfth of all metropolitan areas in 1997-98.
Among high (low) wage cities, 34 (59) percent of all restaurant workers are paid within 120
percent of the minimum wage, our rough measure of the share of workers impacted by such
laws. Based on the estimates in column (4) of table 2, the average predicted price response
for low and high wage cities is 0.097 and 0.090, respectively.35 The relationship between these
variables (slope of the line connecting high and low wage cities) is .97−.90
.59−.34 = 0.28, slightly
lower than, and statistically indistinguishable from, observed labor share in the restaurant
industry. Furthermore, we get a similar labor share prediction when we estimate equation
(2) using the store-level data.36
34For housing, γ (and its adjusted standard error) is -0.31 (0.33). For medical care, it is -0.06 (0.33).
35The 20th percentile restaurant wage in the high wage cities is $5.25, compared to $4.82 in the low wage
cities.
36To derive γ from the micro data, we use the regression results from column 4 of table 2, which gives the
relationship between
∆ ln pit
∆ ln wmin,it and the 20th percentile of city market wage. Next, we regress the share of
workers in a city’s restaurant industry that are paid the minimum wage, prob(wit = wmin,it), on the 20th
percentile of that city’s market wage. Using the 27 major CPI cities during 1995 to 1997, the point estimate
from this latter regression is prob(wit = wmin,it) = 0.839 − 0.068 × wage20it + νit, where wage20it is the 20th
percentile of city i’s wage distribution at time t. From these two regression equations, we can solve γ = 0.24.
Ideally we could precisely estimate equation (2) using the micro data. Unfortunately, as we note in footnote 25,
the number of observations in the CPS for individual cities can be small. Consequently, prob(wit = wmin,it)
cannot be precisely estimated. But wage20it can.
224 Theory
In this section, we show how our results contribute to the debate on the employment eﬀects
of the minimum wage. Assorted models oﬀer diﬀering explanations for why the estimated
employment responses to minimum wage hikes are small. As we point out below, however,
most of these models imply that prices either do not change or fall in response to a minimum
wage hike. Therefore, our results provide evidence against models that have been used to
explain the small employment responses found in the minimum wage literature.
Throughout the discussion we assume that all ﬁrms are proﬁt maximizers and thus set
the level of employment, L, at the point where the marginal cost of the last worker hired
MC(L) is equal to the extra revenue she produces (her marginal revenue product of labor,
or MRP(L)). Appendices A and B contain the formal details of the model.
4.1 The Competitive Model
We begin by brieﬂy considering the textbook competitive model. If a minimum wage is
introduced (or increased) beyond the market-clearing wage in a competitive labor market,
the marginal cost of hiring a worker increases. In response, holding all else equal, ﬁrms will
move along their downward sloping marginal revenue product of labor curve until they reach
the point where MRP(L) is again equated to marginal cost. Higher MRP(L) can only be
obtained by reducing the workforce. Why? One important reason is that fewer workers imply
less output. Even if an additional worker produced the same amount as the previous worker,
reduced output increases output prices, marginal revenue, and thus the marginal revenue
product of labor. Therefore, minimum wage hikes cause prices to rise and employment to fall
in a competitive labor market environment.
4.2 The Textbook Monopsony Model
However, under monopsony, increasing the minimum wage can cause employment to rise.
The fundamental reason is tied to the link between the wage, the marginal cost of labor,
and the product price. In this section we describe the textbook model of monopsony, where
ﬁrms are monopolists in the product market and monopsonists in the labor market. In
Section 4.3 we show that the key results hold under the more realistic scenario of monopolistic
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Figure 2: Illustration of monopsony equilibrium
Unlike the competitive ﬁrm, which pays the prevailing market wage regardless of how
much labor it demands, if the monopsonist wants to expand its labor force, it has to raise
the wage of its current workers as well.37 Therefore, the marginal cost of hiring a worker
is greater than the new worker’s wage. Figure 2 shows the wage the ﬁrm would have to
pay in order to attract an additional worker, w(L), and the marginal cost of hiring that
worker MC(L). When the monopsonist maximizes proﬁts by setting marginal costs equal
to marginal product, shown at point A, total market employment, L∗, is lower than the
“competitive case” (L∗∗) where employment is set based on the prevailing market wage w∗∗.
A properly placed minimum wage, set somewhere between the wage
37This is true if the monopsonist cannot perfectly discriminate between workers with high reservation wages














Figure 3: Illustration of monopsony equilibrium with minimum wage (Bold line
denotes MC(L) curve)
paid by a monopsonist (w∗) and the wage paid by a perfect competitor (w∗∗), will increase
employment. The intuition for this result, displayed in ﬁgure 3, is that although the minimum
wage increases the ﬁrm’s average cost of labor, it reduces the marginal cost of labor. Recall
that, absent a minimum wage, the marginal cost of hiring that last worker (at point A) lies
above the wage paid by the monopsonist (because everyone’s wage has to be raised in order to
induce a marginal worker to join the ﬁrm). If the minimum wage is set above the monopsony
equilibrium wage but below the marginal cost of hiring a worker, the new marginal cost
of hiring a worker falls from point A to point C (the new marginal cost of labor curve is
BCDEF); the marginal cost of hiring additional workers is now just the minimum wage.
Because the ﬁrm must pay all workers at least the minimum wage, regardless of employment
25level, the ﬁrm does not have to increase the pay of its existing workforce to attract more
employees (so long as employment is below Lmin). This reduction in the marginal cost of
hiring additional labor causes ﬁrms to expand output and employment in response to the
minimum wage increase.
Moreover, employment and prices are negatively related because the fall in the marginal
cost of labor causes the marginal cost of producing an extra unit to fall. Consequently, the
product price falls as well.
It is important to note that if ﬁrms are monopsonists in the labor market but the mini-
mum wage is set suﬃciently high (above w∗∗ in Figure 2), employment is determined by the
intersection of the minimum wage and the marginal product of revenue curve. In this case, an
increase in the minimum wage increases prices and reduces employment, just like in a com-
petitive labor market. Thus our empirical results cannot necessarily disprove the existence of
monopsony labor markets in cases where the minimum wage is set high (above competitive
market-clearing levels). However, we believe our empirical results should temper enthusiasm
for monopsony power being the explanation for the negligible employment responses found
in the literature.
4.3 Price and Employment Responses when there is Monopsonistic Com-
petition in the Labor Market and Monopolistic Competition in the
Product Market
The results in the previous section were based on a very stylized model. In this section,
we show that those results are quite general under weak assumptions about technology,
the product market, and the labor market. Speciﬁcally, the results hold when ﬁrms have
a production function with substitutability between labor and other inputs, monopolistic
competition in the product market, and monopsonistic competition in the labor market.
Several researchers have argued that monopsonistic competition in the labor market is
the relevant case (Bhashkar and To (1999), Dickens et al. (1999)). That is, workers are
not indiﬀerent between employers, even if all employers pay the same wage. One plausible
explanation is geography. Employers are located in diﬀerent places and transportation costs
are large relative to earnings of minimum wage workers. Thus a worker is willing to take
a low paying job in order to be relatively near home. Alternatively, teenagers may want to
26work at the same restaurant as their friends. More generally, certain aspects of one employer
may be disagreeable to some workers but not others.
In order to simplify the problem, we make six assumptions beyond the usual axioms of
ﬁrm behavior:
Assumption 1 There is a ﬁxed number N of ﬁrms.
Assumption 2 All ﬁrms have an identical production function, Qn = Q(Kn,Ln) where
Qn,Kn,Ln are output, an aggregator of non-labor input (that includes capital), and labor at
the nth ﬁrm.
Assumption 3 The production function is increasing in all inputs, concave, continuous and
twice diﬀerentiable.
Assumption 4 K and L are complementary inputs in the production function (Q12 > 0).















and Qn denotes output at the nth restaurant. Concavity implies η > 0 and ηZ ∈ [0,1).
Assumption 6 The ﬁrm is a price taker in the capital market and purchases Kn at price
r. However, the ﬁrm is potentially a monopsonist in the labor market. The quantity of labor
supplied to the ﬁrm is LS
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> 0.
Under these assumptions, ﬁrms sell their products at a price p(Q) and choose inputs to
maximize proﬁts π :
πn(Kn,Ln) = p(Qn)Qn − wnLn − rKn. (3)
These assumptions are standard, although a few require some elaboration. Assumption
5 gives rise to monopolistic competition in the product market. Markets are perfectly com-
petitive if ηZ = 0 and ﬁrms operate as monopolists if ηZ = η. Assumption 6 states that the
quantity of labor supplied to the ﬁrm need not be perfectly elastic and, therefore, ﬁrms face a
27monopsonistically competitive labor market. Consequently, ﬁrms face a weakly upward slop-
ing inverse labor supply curve, w(Ln), where
dw(Ln,w−n)
dLn ≥ 0. However, because the minimum
wage potentially binds, the oﬀered wage is wn = max{w(Ln,w−n),wmin}.38
Firms may be price takers in the labor market because the labor supply curve that the
ﬁrm faces is perfectly elastic or the minimum wage is suﬃciently high that it destroys the
ﬁrm’s monopsony power. Either way, if ﬁrms are price takers in the labor market, Theorem
1 holds.
Theorem 1 Given the assumptions above, and if ﬁrms are price takers in the labor market,
the industry level demand curve for labor slopes down.
Proof: see Appendix A. Theorem 1 is more general than the discussion in Section 4.1.
There, it is presumed that ﬁrms make employment decisions given a ﬁxed MRP(L) curve,
an assumption that is appropriate for monopolists. But, under monopolistic competition,
minimum wage changes potentially shift the MRP(L) curve by altering the decision of other
ﬁrms, and thus inﬂuencing aggregate prices. Theorem 1 also diﬀers from the Weak Axiom
of Proﬁt Maximization, which assumes perfect competition in both the product and factor
markets.39
Section 4.2 discusses why employment can rise under monopsony. Given assumption 6,
this is true under monopolistic competition as well. Together with Theorem 1, this shows that
minimum wage hikes cause employment to fall under competition and rise under monopsony.
The next theorem shows that we can use prices to infer the importance of monopsony
power in the labor market.
Theorem 2 Given an increase in a binding minimum wage, prices rise under perfect com-
petition and, so long as wmin < w∗∗, prices fall under monopsony.
38The assumption of capital and labor being complementary inputs (i.e. Q12 > 0) rules out situations where
the proﬁt maximizing choice would be to switch from a capital intensive, high output technology to a labor
intensive, low output technology. An example of this is a ﬁrm that is capital eﬃcient only up to a certain size.
After this size, capital cannot be eﬃciently used. For example, suppose p = 1, r = 1, Q = K
.5L
.5 if L < 10 and
Q = L
.5 if L ≥ 10. Increasing L from 9 to 10 would reduce output but depending on the cost of labor, could
increase proﬁts. However, this rather extreme counter-example appears to go against the empirical evidence.
For example, it is diﬃcult to reject the hypothesis that production functions are constant returns to scale,
and constant returns production functions implicitly assume Q12 > 0.
39See Varian (1984) and Kennan (1998) for proofs of Theorem 1 under competition and monopoly, respec-
tively. We have also proved the theorems in this section for the case where ﬁrms are Cournot competitors in
the output market. Proofs are available from the authors.
28Proof: see Appendix A. The intuition for Theorem 2 was discussed in Section 4.2.
Finally, there is the quantitative importance of price pass through when there is monop-
olistic competition in the product market. Theorem 3 shows that if the production function
is constant elasticity of substitution, then ﬁrms still push 100% of the higher labor costs onto
consumers in the form of higher prices.
Theorem 3 If Q(.,.) is a constant elasticity of substitution aggregator, and if ﬁrms are price
takers in the labor market, then
dlnp
dlnwmin = minimum wage labor’s share.
Proof: see Aaronson and French (2007). The intuition for this result is straightforward.
Given the assumptions above, ﬁrms have a constant marginal cost and thus have a horizontal
supply curve. Thus, in a perfectly competitive market, all higher labor costs will be pushed
onto consumers in the form of higher prices. In the case of monopolistic competition in the
product market, there is a constant mark-up over marginal cost. Thus the supply curve is
still horizontal and all labor costs are pushed onto consumers in the form of higher prices.
Furthermore, Aaronson and French give predicted price and employment responses under
monopsonistic competition. They show that if the employment response is large and positive,
then the price response will be large and negative. For example, if the employment elasticity
is +0.2, which is possible under monopsony, then the price response will be -0.05. These price
responses vary notably from what is reported in Table 2.
The only assumption that we view as not innocuous is the ﬁrst. Although the size of a
business is allowed to change in response to a higher minimum wage, ﬁrm exit or entry is
precluded. We think this is a reasonable assumption given the existing, albeit rather meager,
empirical evidence.40 Moreover, in this paper, we are interested in a short-term response that
likely severely limits entry and exit decisions.
The main reason for assuming no exit is that under monopsony, minimum wage hikes in-
crease employment per restaurant, but likely reduce the total number of restaurants. There-
40Card and Krueger (1995) and Machin and Wilson (2004) ﬁnd no eﬀect in the U.S. and U.K., respectively.
We have done some analysis of restaurant entry and exit using the Census’ Longitudinal Business Database.
Consistent with the literature, our preliminary ﬁndings suggest negligible entry and exit eﬀects in the year
following a minimum wage change. These results stand in contrast to those of Campbell and Lapham (2004),
who ﬁnd a signiﬁcant amount of retail net entry along the U.S.-Canada border within a year of exchange rate
movements. We suspect these diﬀerent results reﬂect the importance of exchange rates relative to minimum
wage levels in terms of ﬁrm costs.
29fore, the industry level employment response is ambiguous. In this sense, we view the as-
sumption of no exit as supporting the monopsony argument.41
4.4 Eﬃciency Wage Models
Eﬃciency wage models (where increased wages increase eﬀort or reduce turnover costs),
often give monopsony like predictions. Manning (1995), Rebitzer and Taylor (1995), and
Deltas (1999) all present models where increases in the minimum wage can increase employ-
ment. None of these models allows for capital-labor substitutability, and only Deltas (1999)
allows for endogenous prices. Below we present an eﬃciency wage model with endogenous
prices and capital-labor substitutability.
We follow Solow (1979), who argues that the wage aﬀects morale and eﬀort amongst
other things, and let the wage enter the production function directly. If an increase in the
wage causes increased eﬀort, more meals can be produced with the same amount of labor and
capital. Therefore, it is not necessarily more costly to produce meals when the minimum wage
increases. This can attenuate the disemployment eﬀects of the minimum wage. However, if
employment does not fall (and other factors do not fall either) and productivity rises, total
output will rise and product prices will fall.
Let the production function be:
Q = Q(K,L,w) =
 
(1 − α)Kρ + α(Lwθ)ρ  1
ρ, (4)
where σ ≡ 1
1−ρ is the partial elasticity of substitution between K and Lwθ in the production
of Q, and Lwθ is “eﬀective labor”. The parameter 0 ≤ θ < 1 may be greater than 0
because increases in the wage increase eﬀort, which could happen for a variety of reasons.
Furthermore, assume that Assumptions 1 to 5 in Section 4.3 hold. Then the price and
41Nevertheless, we also understand that, given our assumed market structure, entry and exit can change
the market price for a given industry output. This is potentially important because Bashkar and To (1999)
argue that an increase in the minimum wage could reduce the number of ﬁrms in the market but increase
employment per restaurant, causing total employment to potentially increase. Because the number of ﬁrms
decrease, market power of survivors increase. Consequently, both prices and output may increase. However,
given the small observed exit rates in response to minimum wage hikes, we doubt that these eﬀects would be




= s(1 − θ) (5)
dlnL
dlnw
= −(1 − θ)
 
(1 − s)σ − sη
 
− θ (6)
where s is the share of total costs going to labor. When θ = 0, equations (5) and (6) give
the textbook response to the minimum wage. However, when θ > 0 (and all else is equal),
a one percent increase in the wage increases eﬀective labor θ percent, causing the marginal
cost of eﬀective labor to only rise 1 − θ percent. This has implications for both prices and
employment responses. The price response is attenuated, rising by s(1−θ) percent, a fraction
(1 − θ) less than without endogenous work eﬀort. The employment response is also muted
by (1 − θ) due to an increase in the marginal cost of labor. However, the same amount of
eﬀective labor and output can be produced with fewer bodies, lessening the need for labor
(the −θ term at the end of equation (6)).
Regardless, while a smaller employment response relative to the case without endogenous
work eﬀort is possible, the model clearly predicts a smaller price response as well. However,
our estimates indicate large price responses to the minimum wage. Thus, our price results
provide evidence against the hypothesis that endogenous work eﬀort is responsible for the
small observed employment responses to minimum wage hikes.
4.5 Other Models of the Employment Eﬀects of the Minimum Wage
We have argued that the price responses to minimum wage hikes are useful for distin-
guishing between competition and monopsony in the labor market. Likewise, our estimated
price responses help shed light on other explanations of the small employment response found
in the minimum wage literature.
Some researchers (e.g. Kennan 1995, MaCurdy and OBrien-Strain 2000) suggest higher
income resulting from a minimum wage increase causes low wage workers to buy more min-
imum wage products, attenuating the disemployment eﬀect of the minimum wage. For the
restaurant industry, Kennan refers to this possibility as the ”hungry teenager hypothesis.”
The price response reported in this paper is a key parameter for such a calculation. Aaronson
31and French (2006) write down a model that allows for such demand-induced feedbacks and
show that increases in the minimum wage reduce real income for non-minimum wage workers
(because prices rise) but increase real income of minimum wage workers (because their wage
rises). They ﬁnd that if minimum wage workers spend a large fraction of their income on fast
food, then the rise in incomes for fast food workers can at least partly oﬀset the disemploy-
ment eﬀect of the minimum wage. Using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey and
US Department of Agriculture’s Continuing Survey of Food Intake by Individuals, they ﬁnd
that minimum wage workers spend between 20 and 100% more of their income on fast food
as those who are not minimum wage workers.42 Given these estimates (and other calibrated
parameters) the increased income going to minimum wage workers can oﬀset between 25 and
40% of the output loss, and 10 to 30% of the employment loss of a model that does not
account for the increased income and increased expenditures of minimum wage workers.
Our price responses are less consistent with the idea that that minimum wage laws merely
cause ﬁrms to reshuﬄe compensation packages from non-wage beneﬁts to wages. For exam-
ple, fast food restaurants could stop giving workers free meals after minimum wage hikes.
Hashimoto (1982) and Neumark and Wascher (2001) argue that ﬁrms may reduce training
after minimum wage hikes. As a result, there is no increase in the cost of labor faced by ﬁrms.
However, if the minimum wage does not increase the cost of labor, it is unclear why there
are price increases after minimum wage changes. Although shifting compensation packages
from non-wage to wage beneﬁts may occur, our results indicate that ﬁrms still bear a sizeable
fraction of the cost of minimum wage hikes. In this sense, our ﬁndings are consistent with
Card and Krueger (1995), who also ﬁnd very little substitution between wage and non-wage
beneﬁts after minimum wage hikes and also ﬁnd no evidence of minimum wage hikes on
training.
Finally, our analysis has not considered search models (e.g. Burdett and Mortensen
1998), which also give monopsony implications for employment. A full analysis of the variety
of search models is well beyond the scope of this paper, especially since most of them would
need to be modiﬁed to account for endogenous product prices and capital labor substituabil-
ity. However, it seems likely that employment and prices would move in opposite directions
in most standard applications of search. For example, given that the Burdett and Mortensen
42MaCurdy and OBrien-Strain (2000) also ﬁnd that low income individuals spend a greater fraction of their
budget on products produced by minimum wage workers.
32production technology is linear in labor (i.e. no substitution among inputs), increases in
employment increase output and should presumably reduce the product price were it endo-
genized. It is also worth noting that most estimated search models, including Van den Berg
and Ridder (1998), Flinn (2006), Ahn and Arcidiacono (2003), ﬁnd some disemployment in
response to a minimum wage increase.
Arguably, our empirical results themselves - that marginal cost shocks are passed onto
consumers through higher output prices - may be consistent with small disemployment eﬀects.
If restaurants face factors that limit their ability to raise prices, say because it is costly to
switch prices, or because the price elasticity of demand for food away from home is inﬁnitely
elastic, the predicted disemployment eﬀects of a minimum wage increase would be larger
than if these factors did not hinder price behavior. If ﬁrms cannot pass cost increases onto
consumers, then proﬁts will be squeezed and ﬁrms may sharply cut their workforce. Given
that we ﬁnd rather large price increases in response to minimum wage hikes, ﬁrms seem to
be able to push costs onto consumers, and are not having their proﬁts greatly reduced.
Instead, we interpret our results to be consistent with the moderate disemployment eﬀects
reported in Aaronson and French (2007). They calibrate a structural model of labor demand
that incorporates the price responses found here to show that a 10 percent increase in the
minimum wage reduces restaurant employment by 2 to 3 percent, a short run response that
is within the range of estimates found in the literature. Moreover, the total (low plus high
skill) restaurant employment response may be as small as 1 percent.
5 Conclusion
Much work has looked at the employment implications of raising the minimum wage,
with a range of estimates reported in the literature. We oﬀer new empirical evidence using
output prices both at the store-level and aggregated to the city-level. In both cases, prices
unambiguously increase in response to a minimum wage change. Furthermore, the results are
similar across three sources of variation in the data: cross-state diﬀerences in the size of the
minimum wage change, cross-restaurant type diﬀerences in the tendency to pay at or near
the minimum wage, and cross-metro diﬀerences in the fraction of workers paid at or near
the minimum wage. There is no evidence that prices fall in response to a minimum wage
increase.
33We interpret these ﬁndings within a simple yet quite general model of employment deter-
mination that shows that monopsony and perfect competition have opposite implications for
not only employment but output prices as well, so long as the minimum wage is not set too
high. In particular, under monopsony, an increase in a binding minimum wage causes em-
ployment to rise and output prices to fall. Under competition, employment falls and output
prices rise. Therefore, our price results appear to provide evidence against the hypothesis that
monopsony power is important for understanding the small observed employment response
to minimum wage changes. Indeed, our estimated price responses provide evidence against
other explanations of the small employment response, including the potential substitution of
nonwage for wage compensation and the importance of endogenous work eﬀort. Rather, we
interpret our price results to be fairly consistent with the textbook model of labor demand.
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39Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Theorm 1
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) point out that two-stage budgeting techniques can be used














pnQn = X, (8)








where λ is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint for expenditure on ˜ Q, i.e., it is
the multiplier on the ﬁrst stage constraint. If N is suﬃciently large, then Qn is small relative
to ˜ Q and thus the ﬁrm does not take into account the eﬀect of Qn on ˜ Q when assessing the
eﬀect of Qn on pn.
Inserting equation (9) into equation (3) yields
π(Kn,Ln) = ΩQ1−ηZ
n − wnLn − rKn (10)
where Ω = λ−1 ˜ QηZ. The ﬁrst order condition for maximization of the proﬁt function (10)
with respect to Kn yields
Ω(1 − ηZ)Q−ηZ
n Qn,1 = r (11)
where
∂Qn
∂Kn ≡ Qn,1. If the ﬁrm is a price taker in the labor market, then employment is
40determined by maximization of equation (10) with respect to Ln, which yields
Ω(1 − ηZ)Q−ηZ
n Qn,2 = w. (12)
where
∂Qn
∂Ln ≡ Qn,2. First, we discuss the case where the ﬁrm is a price taker in the labor
market. Given the assumptions above, all ﬁrms are of equal size, so ˜ Q = N
1
1−ηZ Qn. Because














ηZ−1. Using these deﬁnitions
and Assumption 5, one can show that
dln ˜ Q
dln ˜ p = −η.
Because price changes are responses to supply shocks, price changes identify the demand
curve for the aggregate product, so
dln ˜ Q
dln ˜ p = −η∗ for some η∗ ∈ (0,η], where η∗ = η if the
















where we are assuming that dlnN
dlnw = 0. Taking logs and diﬀerentiating equations (11) and















and diﬀerentiating equation (11) and (12) with respect to lnr and inserting equations anal-








































































































The term An is negative. Therefore, the quantity of labor demanded falls when the price
rises. The market employment change is N times the ﬁrm level employment change.
42We consider the monopsony case next. Because both the production and utility functions
are smooth, small changes in the minimum wage result in small changes in the MRP(Ln),
denoted in equation (12). Therefore, employment is determined by labor supply, not labor
demand. Figure 3 clariﬁes this point. Given the assumed upward sloping labor supply curve,
employment rises in response to an increase in the minimum wage.
QED.
Proof of Theorem 2
Consider the case of perfectly competitive labor markets ﬁrst. Deﬁne p, Q and L as the
market price, output and employment. Because all ﬁrms produce the same amount, p = pn,































The numerator of this expression is negative and the denominator is positive if Qn,12 > 0.
Therefore,
dQ
dw < 0. Since
dp
dQ < 0 by assumption,
dp
dw > 0 under perfectly competitive labor
markets.
Now consider the monopsony case. Recall that under the monopsony case, labor is deter-
mined by labor supply, not labor demand. Therefore, we can take labor supply as exogenous.




















dQ < 0 and dL
dw > 0, all that remains is to prove that
dQ
dL > 0 when dL
is taken as exogenous in order to prove that
dp
dw < 0 under monopsony.










dlnL and for reasons discussed in the proof of Theorem 1, equation (29)
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for some η∗ ∈ (0,η], where dlnN
















































where the term in parentheses is dKn
dL . The denominator of this term is negative. The ﬁrst
term in the numerator is positive but the second term is non-positive, making the sign of the
numerator term in parentheses ambiguous. However,
dQn



































































which is greater than 0 if Qn,12 is greater than 0. Therefore,
dQn
dL > 0 and thus
dQ
dL > 0 and
dp
dw < 0 under monopsony. QED.
Appendix B: Price and Employment Responses in Models with Endogenous
Work Eﬀort
In this appendix we assume that ﬁrms are price takers in all markets (so ηZ = 0), although
using the results in Aaronson and French (2004) it is straightforward to account for the case
where ηZ > 0. That paper provides a similar and more detailed derivation than the one
below, although they assume θ = 0.
Maximization of equation (3) with respect to K and L, and taking logs, yields:










Assume that product prices potentially change in response to a change in the minimum wage,
but the price of capital does not. Diﬀerentiating equations (37) and (38) with respect to lnw,

























+ (1 − σ)θ + σ, (40)
where η is the elasticity of demand for the product (in absolute value), as in the text. Fur-



























p, and denoting s = wL
pQ as
45labor’s share, some algebra shows that equation (41) can be rewritten as:
dlnQ
dlnw







Using equations (39), (40), and (42), we can solve for the unknowns:
dlnQ
dlnw
= −ηs(1 − θ), (43)
dlnK
dlnw
= s(1 − θ)(σ − η), (44)
dlnL
dlnw
= −(1 − θ)
 
(1 − s)σ − sη
 
− θ. (45)
The price response will be
dlnp
dlnw
= s(1 − θ). (46)
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